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Introduction 
This report intends to expand our knowledge as well as to contribute to the existent 
historiography on the Near East Relief (NER), an American humanitarian organization, 
which has been understudied. We wish to pinpoint three main aspects of the NER’s early 
history. The first being tension between one of the main ideological assumptions of the 
organization—i.e., to carry out rehabilitation programs that went beyond short-term 
emergency relief—and the absolute necessity to undertake vast relief operations. The NER’s 
Caucasus Branch operation illustrates this tension. Second, the 1919-1920 relief operation in 
the Caucasus sheds light on why it was necessary for the NER to cooperate with other 
American organizations, such as the American Relief Administration (ARA) and the 
American Red Cross (ARC). We will provide details about this complex relationship later in 
the report. Finally, this research report provides an opportunity to reflect on the ideology(ies) 
and working methods of NER workers. Contrary to what one might think, the NER was far 
from being a monolithic organization. The Board of Trustees, the executives, and the men 
(and women) on the spot had different views on the NER’s objectives as well as on how they 
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should be achieved. In 2009, Sarah Miglio wrote a Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) 
research report entitled “America’s Sacred Duty: Near East Relief and the Armenian Crisis, 
1915-1930.” It was based on some of the sources referred to in our RAC research report. 
Miglio focused on America’s “Sacred Duty” in the Near East and more specifically, on the 
Armenians during and after the genocide. Our objective is to offer a closer look at the 
operational work carried out by the NER. Miglio focused on the significance of the Armenian 
crisis for the American public, whereas our objective is to look into more pragmatic aspects 
of the programs of the NER for Armenians and other civilian populations. 
Before delving into these components, we wish to address a problem that scholars 
working on the NER face. No central archives of the organization exists. As a result, the NER 
collection at the RAC is of crucial importance for those interested in its history. The NER 
sources are unprocessed. The boxes contain heterogeneous material, including diaries, 
unpublished manuscripts, memoires, pamphlets, and a vast array of propaganda material, as 
well as pictures (with and without captions). Further information on the NER is to be found at 
the National Archives in Washington, the American Board Committee of Foreign Missions 
(ABCFM), located at the Houghton Library at, Harvard University, and in the archives of 
various other organizations that interacted with the NER such as the International Labour 
Organization, the League of Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the 
League of Red Cross Societies. The ARA archives are also of relevance for the Caucasus 
operations, including William Haskell’s papers, located at the Hoover Archives, Stanford 
University, as well as the ARC archives, which are dispersed among at least three different 
archives. Although we have already visited a number of these archives, the sources at that 
RAC on the NER are of vital importance for our research. This research report will only take 
the research carried out at the RAC during the summer of 2011 into account. 
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The Broader Context of Humanitarian Operations in the Aftermath of WW I  
In the aftermath of the First World War, a number of secular and faith-based 
organizations, including philanthropic foundations and inter-governmental organizations, 
such as the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization (ILO), established 
various humanitarian programs on behalf of civilian populations. There were a number of 
organizations who focused solely on fundraising or those that took part in relief operations. 
As far as the provision of relief was concerned, there were organizations that focused on 
short term-relief, comprised of food, clothing, provisional shelter, and medical aid. Some 
organizations sought to extend this further and combined short-term relief with medium-term 
programs. There were also a number of umbrella organizations that centralized fund-raising 
campaigns. 
The NER was one of the main organizations in the Near and Middle East that carried 
out both short-term operations and medium-term programs. It is estimated that over one 
hundred and ten million dollars was donated to the NER by American individuals, American 
philanthropic foundations and other organizations, for the cause of relief and rebuilding 
during the interwar period. The vast majority of these funds were intended for the relief and 
rehabilitation of the Armenians. This organization also undertook programs on behalf of 
other ex-Ottoman Christian populations, mainly Greek Orthodox refugees in Greece after 
1922, and the Assyrians scattered throughout the Middle East. On August 6, 1919, the U.S. 
Congress incorporated the committee known as the Near East Relief and officially approved 
the NER’s efforts to organize food, medicine and refugee administration in the Near East.2 In 
1918-1919, President Woodrow Wilson granted his support to the NER and became involved 
in the political settlement of the “Armenian Question.”3 Wilson encouraged the federal 
government to donate relief supplies to the NER and this remained unchanged under 
President Harding’s administration. The incorporation of the NER by the U.S. Congress was 
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not exceptional. The ARA, led by Herbert Hoover, was incorporated in February 1919. It 
should also be noted that Wilson was the president of the ARC.
4
 Similar to the ARA and 
NER, the ARC was closely connected to the White House and the U.S. federal government, 
more specifically to the State Department. This was a characteristic of U.S. humanitarian 
organizations, the NER included.
5
  
As Miglio and other scholars have pointed out, the Armenians captured the United 
States imagination and prompted the nation to action.
6
 The genocide of the Armenians during 
the war and American organizations’ aid to the Armenians is not the purpose of this paper. It 
is, however, important not to forget the long-term “special” relations between the Armenians 
and the Americans, which has been examined in various academic works.
7
 The religious 
dimension has been emphasized in all scholarly work on this organization. This was visible in 
the programs undertaken by this organization on behalf of the Armenians and in other 
programs the NER set up on behalf of the Greek Orthodox communities of the ex-Ottoman 
Empire. This archival report will not claim the contrary, however, we draw the attention of 
the readers to the fact that various strands and visions within the organization existed. 
Although there was an intimate connection between Charles Vickery, the secretary of the 
NER, and the representatives of various Protestant American colleges in Turkey, it is also 
true that many secular “experts” of education, rural education and health, brought a different 
perspective on the scope and meaning of NER programs. This is particularly clear when one 
reads unpublished sources found in the NER papers at the RAC, such as Barclay Acheson’s 
diary. 
Therefore, it would be wrong to hastily conclude that the NER was an anti-Islamic or 
anti-Turkish organization. Some of the documents located at the RAC demonstrate that the 
NER would have undertaken further relief work on behalf of Muslim populations, though the 
political conditions in Turkey after the military victory of Mustapha Kemal hindered such 
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programs. Western humanitarian organizations were perceived as violating Turkish 
sovereignty and they had a difficult time continuing their operations within Turkey.
8
 In fact, 
after 1922, the NER conducted the bulk of its operations on the fringes of the ex-Ottoman 
Empire: in Transcaucasia, Syria, Lebanon, and Greece. The major exception was 
Constantinople, as it was an internationally occupied city. These operations took place 
because the bulk of Armenian communities had been deported or had fled from their villages 
and towns during the war. Moreover, as the NER depended on the funds raised within 
Protestant as well as Catholic communities in the United States, preference was given to 
Christian populations. 
The NER was not immune to Orientalist stereotypes, which had been proliferated in 
Europe and in North America since the mid-nineteenth century. It shared the same 
paternalist/imperialist disposition towards local populations both Christian and non-Christian. 
NER relief workers often interpreted their mission as the rescue of “progressive” Armenians 
from “barbarian” and “degenerate” Turks. Sarah Miglio notes that the Americans often had a 
contradictory perception of the Muslins.
9
 For instance, Muslims were sharply criticized for 
their perceived practice of polygamy, their resistance to Christian missionaries, their failure 
to modernize Islamic society, and the persecution of Christians and Jews as well. At the same 
time, Muslims were also revered for their ancient faith, temperance, hygiene and piety. This 
ambivalence is reflected in many reports and diaries located at the RAC.  
 
NER Relief Workers 
One of the characteristics of the NER was the recruitment of its workers. The 
organization was comprised of women and men who were familiar with the region. As we 
shall see below, the NER-Caucasus branch was composed of both missionaries, ARC, who 
were mainly women, working as nurses, and ARA workers, as well as many other “experts.” 
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Barclay Acheson, executive secretary of the NER and later of the Near East Foundation, 
highlights this aspect 
The employed staff on the foreign field who were tussling with the problem of 
making strawless bricks were veterans, battle-scarred by many a hard campaign 
against disease and starvation. Some were well-trained specialists, who gave us the 
accumulated experience of the United States in medicine, sanitation, welfare work, 
orphanage organization, and child care. A few had been trained in the hard tradition of 
military camps. They contributed discipline. Fifteen or twenty were missionaries.
10
 
 
The humanitarianism of these missionaries was biased and selective. An examination of their 
work as medical doctors in various Anatolian villages reveals a discrepancy between the 
Christian rhetoric used in various fund-raising campaigns in the U.S. and the daily work 
carried out by missionaries, doctors, and NER relief workers.
11
 Although the NER used 
religious imagery in some of its publicity and fundraising campaigns, the organization also 
evoked secular themes and issues, such as self-help and modernization. Our argument is that 
the programs and objectives of the NER were not dissimilar from the objectives of other 
secular organizations, both American and European. That being said, the anti-missionary 
rhetoric of Hoover and other secular humanitarian workers in the aftermath of World War I 
was not evoked by the NER. According to the ARA, the latter was generally, but not 
systematically, deemed to belong to the group of “modern” humanitarian organizations. To 
secular humanitarian workers of the ARA or the ARC, “modern” meant to base one’s work 
upon “scientific” methods. Accordingly, relief workers in these organizations were supposed 
to be “experts” in nutrition, medical relief, logistics, etc. In 1940 Acheson, who defined 
himself as a “professional humanitarian”, wrote,  
Most of the Americans received technical training in the United States. To that must be added 
the practical knowledge gained by years of experience and constant contact with welfare 
workers from Europe. Some of our best collaborators were hard-headed local government 
officials. We could not always trust political officialdom with our money, but we could 
depend on them to find the weak spot even in our most cherished plans. In addition, many of 
our policies and much of our technical knowledge came directly from American advisers 
recognized internationally as authorities in their respective fields. Several leaders in 
agriculture, sociology, education, and welfare work spent months in the Near East giving 
careful study to our problems and advice to our personnel.
12
 
7 
 
The NER experts were paternalist and believed that they were culturally superior. Their 
“civilizing” perspective, reminiscent of Edmund Burke and John Stuart Mills, is visible in 
their reports and memoires. Howard Bailey McAfee, one of the experts who worked for the 
NER, reflected in his July 26, 1937, “Notes on Salonika” upon the NER’s experience in 
Greece, and on its principles and methods. The NER placed a high importance on the idea of 
self-help and self-reliance. This is a point that our research project intends to examine in-
depth. Many American and European humanitarian organizations feared the political, social 
and economic consequences of the pauperization of masses of refugees and the unintended 
consequences of prolonged charity. McAfee and the NER—as well as any other European 
organizations, including the League of Nations-High Commissioner for Refugees and the 
ILO—shared the idea of giving refugees work. This would enable the best possible use of the 
limited funds at the organizations disposal. 
Concretely, McAfee informed himself of the available businesses in Salonika. He 
decided that agricultural work was the best solution for the 5,000 refugees there. In his notes, 
McAfee does not indicate which options he had discarded and for what reasons. Moreover, 
he stated, “farmers did not know how to make the best out of the land that was available.”13 
In spite of this, the NER established fifty-four villages. The organization was confident that 
by using “well-proven scientific methods,” the refugees would become much more efficient. 
McAfee’s principles are summarized in the following passage, 
Tell Macedonia story first to show the way the theory was developed and then follow 
up the story with the way conditions are five years later, and up to date…. Here is 
something that America has to give, - scientific knowledge of all kinds. We have great 
resources. We have spent money to find out these things. One man set down over 
there can tap these reservoirs of knowledge and adapt them to local needs in the 
villages. Instead of trying to solve things with a palliative that would leave them 
paupers we set out on the more constructive means of creating a well-to-do hinterland 
that would provide markets.
14
 
 
Acheson confirmed this viewpoint in his diary and in the unpublished typescript, as he wrote, 
“Give those Greek peasants ten acres of land on the Mississippi delta, or even in a less fertile 
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spot, and if we did not wish to buy the products of their farms because we already had more 
food than we could consume, they would build self-contained communities and live joyfully 
and well.”15 In essence, the need for these refugees to become self-sufficient was 
continuously iterated by the NER.  
Acheson expressed the importance of the NER of avoiding any “ostentatious parade 
of American wealth.”16 At the same time, it is clear that improving the fate of the civilians in 
the Near East would have been beneficial for America. Acheson’s classic liberal views are 
evident in his explanation for the establishment of the Salonika old-clothes industry in the 
late 1920s. In his view, the sending of used clothes to Salonika, removed a useless surplus on 
American markets. Those who contributed were financially able to replace it with new 
clothing.  This stimulated business in America and in Greece. This would not only restore the 
self-confidence of the refugees, but would provide an opportunity for them to receive training 
in various trades. Ultimately, discouraged men and women would be rehabilitated, something 
that was evidently beneficial to the American donors. Acheson’s central point was, 
When you take away a person’s self-reliance and his self-respect his manhood decays, 
and that the preservation of these virtues is as important as the preservation of life 
itself … It was not textbook theories, but the bitter experience of realizing what 
happened in places where refugees were fed in idleness and contrasting the results 
with other places where the refugees had to shift for themselves because no one could 
or would help them, that gradually convinced our practical, kindly executives that 
emergency relief should be given for the shortest time possible and then only in 
exchange for value received … feeding alone, when there is no permanent cure in 
sight, it is like building a bridge off into space.
17
 
 
 
The Recipients of NER Aid: (Christian) Refugees and Children 
NER relief workers distinguished between two recipients of aid: Christian refugees 
and children. The NER programs for adult refugees were discontinued after 1924 due to a 
lack of funds. When the NER undertook the responsibility of bringing the children out of 
Turkey, it endorsed the “obligation to develop these foundlings into useful citizens, both for 
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the sake of the children themselves and for the sake of the countries that had given them 
refuge.”  
  The NER focused on programs for children, especially orphans.
18
 The NER’s action 
in this field demonstrated the continuity between the NER and missionaries’ ideal of 
“training these parentless children for leadership in an intellectual and social renaissance in 
the Levant.” The NER called upon several “experts,” including McAfee who operated in the 
region of Kavalla (Greece). McAfee established a plan that consisted of placing both  
Armenian and Greek teenagers in peasant homes as student farmers. He or a member of his 
staff visited homes. When they found the type of home they wanted, a boy was selected and 
taken into the home. According to Acheson, good ordinary people turned these orphans into 
hard-working citizens. These “student farmers” were placed under a one-year contract. They 
worked for room and board, and were given a small piece of land to cultivate. “The crop from 
that bit of land was probably the first thing in all the world that was completely their own.”19 
As Acheson noted, “these boys took root themselves, they became part of a community as 
they shared its hopes and fears.”20 The NER’s plan of moulding the new leadership in the 
Near East combined innovation and tradition. For instance, in adherence to local traditions, 
McAfee assisted in matrimonial practices, which consisted of selecting the brides, 
interviewing the parents, and arranging the details for eight new ventures in matrimony. We 
have not found any report or general assessment of this program in the NER documents.   
McAfee’s ambitious schemes seem to be an exception rather than the rule.  
  
From Relief to Rehabilitation 
George Stewart was hired by the NER to assess the work carried out in the Near East. 
He wrote that an “emergency phase,” which ended by 1925, had characterized the NER 
programs since the end of the First World War.
21
 In early 1925, the NER Executive 
Committee asked Stewart to write a report, which would be part of a set of reports intended 
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to help the Board decide how to reshape the organization, now that the emergency relief 
phase of its work was over.
22
 It is interesting to note that the organization sought to assess 
and evaluate their activities in the midst of their relief operations.  
When the organization found itself responsible for hundreds of infants, it concluded 
that “there was but one course of action open: that was to rush food, clothing, and medicines 
to the theatres of direct need.”23 Although the organization’s leaders recognized that 
emergency relief was indispensable to rescue civilian populations and children, this was not 
what the organization had in mind in 1919. According to Stewart the Smyrna disaster in 
September 1922, closed “an epoch of relief work in Asia Minor.”24 Following that event, 
which Stewart defines as a “holocaust,” it was no longer possible to maintain permanent 
work in that large section of Asia Minor. Consequently, all “minority peoples were soon on 
the roads which led to their three possible asylums: the Caucasus, including Armenian, now 
Russian territory; Syria; and Greece.”25 Stewart’s report emphasizes the fact that during this 
period the emergency relief “directed policy of education, hospitalization, and spiritual 
culture was impossible. There were occasions when unusually fine achievements in these 
lines were accomplished, but in the main, refugee conditions forbade the best that could have 
been done in settled conditions.”26 It was only since 1924-1925 that the NER started to give 
19,000-odd children … daily bread and education the best that Christianity in 
America has to offer in the way of training, medical care, and spiritual leadership. 
This period may be called the period of consecutive training.
27 
 
 
The main training activities were: agricultural, shop training, rug-making, dressmaking, fine 
needlework, nurse training, academic studies, college training, and spiritual culture training. 
It was during that period of “consecutive training” that the NER became aware of additional 
needs of the children, such as the elimination of chronic and contagious diseases like favus, 
trachoma, and tuberculosis for example. The organization also realized that there was a 
specific need to train blind and deaf-mute children. In the conclusion of Stewart’s report, the 
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ultimate aim of the NER is revealed, “to graduate every child into a Christian home as a 
member of that family.”28 The NER set up a system to try to locate the relatives of children or 
persons who came from the same locality who might see fit to take a child in as a member of 
their family.  
 
Back to 1919-1920: The NER and its Cooperation with other American Organizations 
in Transcaucasia 
 
After the 1918 armistice, American soldiers organized relief in Transcaucasia, a 
region which included Georgia, the newly-born states of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and 
Northern Anatolia. This region was devastated by four years of war, massacre, disease and 
starvation, and the influx of Ottoman Armenian refugees from Turkey into Russian Armenia. 
It was also severely affected by refugee-related diseases such as cholera, typhoid, dysentery 
and typhus.  
According to Acheson, with the opening of the Black Sea ports, American 
organizations and friends of the Armenian people entered the Caucasus. They reported that 
200,000 people were starving and that $12,500,000 was needed to keep the population alive 
for the next six months. Acheson wrote that private relief funds could not meet such a crisis 
unassisted, so an appeal was made to Herbert Hoover. Reconnaissance surveys by trusted, 
impartial observers (officials from the United States army and the British intelligence office) 
concluded that 330,000 refugees needed help at once, and that adequate help would cost over 
$12,000,000. 
Between January 1919 and July 1920, the total relief disbursed in Armenia and the 
Caucasus was valued at $28,785,426. American agencies joined hands to meet the crisis. The 
American public gave $500,000 through the Red Cross, and over $10,000,000 through the 
NER. A Congressional relief appropriation provided 50,000 tons of food valued at over 
$10,000,000 through the ARA. The NER cooperated fully with the ARA, and more 
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specifically with the European Children’s Fund (ECF). The latter was a sub-branch of the 
ARA whose main objective was to take care of European children.
29
 In a document dated 
November 13, 1919, the ARA claimed that the ECF regarded feeding the children as the most 
important feature of its relief work, one in which the future of the children was taken into 
consideration. The NER fully shared that idea. This accounts for one of the reasons for which 
the ARA-ECF and the American Committee for Relief in the Near East (ACRNE), the 
predecessor of the NER, cooperated and worked together in Transcaucasia.  
The ECF asked the Commonwealth Fund (CF) to assist in this matter by providing a 
supplementary meal each day for Armenian children for a period of three months beginning 
on December 1, 1919. After that time, the ECF expressed hope that the political situation in 
the Near East would have developed sufficiently to determine a “mandatory for Armenia 
(sic!),” and that it would then be possible to “work upon a program of reconstruction with the 
responsibility for the carrying out of that program definitely fixed.” The CF agreed to 
appropriate $750,000 to the ECF for the purchase and transportation of food for the relief of 
Armenian children, for a period of three months, beginning on December 1, 1919.
30
 
The feeding program of Armenian children that was carried out by Colonel William 
Haskell started in late 1919. Haskell wore a double hat in the Caucasus. He was the Allied 
High Commissioner and the head of the ARA. Haskell’s mission included a feeding program, 
a program of medical aid, and one of sending clothing. He and his men, mostly military, 
managed the entire operation. Two of these men are mentioned in the documents of Paxton 
Hibben and Colonel Rhead, who was second in command to Haskell.
31
 U.S. Army officers 
who had been demobilized in 1919 were in command of this operation, and were re-
commissioned for this purpose. ACRNE relief workers were already in the region and when 
the ARA-ECF asked the CF to appropriate $750,000, the ARA and ACRNE joined forces, 
and the ARC also participated in this joint venture. The NER undertook full responsibility for 
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food transportation charges and for the care of parentless children. It was estimated that this 
would cost $500,000 a month. 
The report Haskell wrote in April 1920 mentioned that the CF’s donations enabled 
child feeding operations until the first of August 1920, when “Armenia should be self-
supporting if she ever will be.” Haskell’s report had to show that the CF’s money had been 
spent in the best possible way. He emphasized that the child feeding idea had a distinctive 
advantage in the preservation of home life. Haskell did not conceal the political purpose of 
the mission. In his view, a direct relation between hunger and Bolshevism existed, and 
therefore the child feeding work would have an effect upon the political life of the country. 
According to Haskell, the average worker drifted towards Bolshevism as he saw the prospect 
of supporting and maintaining his family becoming more and more difficult.
32
 Documents at 
the RAC do not reveal the extent to which relief workers were aware of or shared the political 
purpose of their mission.  
  On August 10, 1920, Turkey and the Allied powers signed the Treaty of Sèvres, 
which sanctioned a new Armenian state. This treaty gave President Wilson the task of 
delineating the frontiers between Armenia and Turkey. On November 22, 1920, Wilson 
allocated 87,000 square miles of the provinces of Erzrum, Van, Bitlis, and Trebizond to 
Armenia. In that same month, the Turkish army launched an attack on the Armenians at Kars. 
In the meantime, Russia assisted by Azerbaijan, mobilized troops and sent a note to the 
Armenian government demanding free passage of troops across its territory, renunciation of 
the Treaty of Sèvres, and the severance of all relations with Allied powers. The Armenian 
government refused, hoping that the Allies would come to its rescue, but no help came and 
the Armenian armies were defeated. The government was finally compelled to make a 
calamitous peace with the Turkish forces, one that left Armenia with little more than one-fifth 
of the area allocated to her by President Wilson. This treaty also left Armenia with an almost 
14 
 
indefensible boundary line and scarcely enough land to support its greatly augmented 
population, due to the fact that Armenian refugees had fled from their ancestral homes. 
Within a few months, the threat of further Turkish aggression resulted in the absorption of 
Armenia and Georgia into Soviet Russia.   
   It soon became obvious that Armenia and Georgia could not resist Communist 
infiltration from the north or defend themselves against Turkish invasion from the south. In 
order to avoid international complications, it was therefore necessary for Colonel Haskell,  
and most of his U.S. army officer staff, to withdraw from the Caucasus.  
 
The NER-Caucasus Branch Feeding Operation 
The Haskell/Lonegran report on the child feeding supplies purchased by the CF  
begins with an overview of the child-feeding problem of the Caucasus, with particular 
reference to Armenia.
33
 On September 10, 1919 the NER-Caucasus Branch took over general 
relief work, which had been carried out by the ACRNE and the ARA. Lonegran explains that 
it was difficult for the average native Russian Armenian to support a family and practically 
impossible for the refugee Turkish Armenian to support himself. 
The way the report is structured demonstrates that Lonegran also belonged to the 
“modern” organizations that had adopted the scientific method of surveying the region before 
deciding how to allocate the resources. ARA, ARC and European relief workers proceeded in 
the same way and accurately surveyed the region where aid was supposed to be distributed. It 
was at this stage that inclusion and exclusion processes were established. In this particular 
case, the report did not say anything about Muslim populations and the devastation that these 
communities also faced. Instead, he expanded on the conditions of Armenian children.   
The report explained that before the merger of the programs, ACRNE had set up 
orphanages, day-homes, and soup kitchens, while in addition to its large flour distribution 
program, the ARA established cocoa-kitchens for children in the town of Alexandropol. 
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These institutions were continued by the NER after its absorption of the programs undertaken 
by the ACRNE and ARA.   
The territory over which the NER’s Caucasus Branch extended its operations was 
divided into the districts of Batoum, Borjom (Akhalakalaki), Baku, Tiflis, Karaklis, 
Alexandropol, Kars, and Erivan. The boundaries of these districts were fixed by the central 
office in Tiflis (today’s Tbilisi), and did not correspond to the political boundaries (at the end 
of the report a map indicates the borders of the various districts). According to NER sources, 
approximately two million people resided in what was formerly known as Russian Armenia 
and what was known in 1919 as Armenia. Approximately 300,000 were refugees from the 
Ottoman Empire who might ask for repatriation when boundary lines would be definitely 
fixed. In early 1920 the NER thought that this issue would be solved quickly. The report 
provides some statistics but it does not say much about the living conditions of non-
Armenian populations.  
 
According to the NER, 1,300,000 were Armenians; 65,000 Georgians, Russians and Greeks; 
537,000 Tartars; 61,000 Turks; 75,000 Kurds; and, 38,000 Izides. For food relief purposes, 
the Armenians had been classified by the NER as follows: 
Russian Armenians:    467,761 
Armenian Army:    30,000 
Refugee Russian Armenians:  58,300 
Native Poor Russian Armenians: 365,665 
Refugee Turkish Armenians:  284,974 
Refugee Oriental Armenians:            39,300 (not coming from the Ottoman Empire) 
Refugee Turkish Armenians from 
Van district:    6,000 
Orphans:    35,000 
Total:     1,296,000  
 
Barclay Acheson talked about “old camps” where “once self-respecting, industrious people 
were rapidly becoming self-pitying parasites.” He admitted that at that time, because of the 
humanitarian emergency, none of the NER advisers, and certainly none of the NER workers 
knew what to do. The road to a “constructive cure” was difficult. There was concern that the 
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orphans would become a generation that risked “the loss of initiative, inventiveness and self-
reliance—a danger inherent in the lock-step discipline of institutions.” It was at that time, and 
because of the 1919-1922 experience, that Acheson became increasingly aware that 
“unthinking generosity might do as much harm as good.”34  The situation in the Caucasus and 
elsewhere for that matter, presented itself as a precedent to improve the medium-term 
programs the NER undertook after 1923. Furthermore, it was in the early 1920s that the NER 
became aware of how difficult it was to persuade Americans to support constructive work.  
Take the refugees out of those squalid camps—Acheson wrote—and put them into 
pleasant villages, and the melodramatic tragedy that the public loved would be gone. 
Empty those barracks-like orphanages and place the children with simple, kindly, but 
crudely primitive foster-parents, and the satisfaction that both an individual and a 
nation derive from playing God disappears. We would lose the fiction that these 
children were going to modernise the Near East and the sob-stories that arouse 
emotions and raise money.
35
 
 
Acheson was acutely aware that people would be more inclined to donate money for tiny 
tuberculosis victims on the verge of death. As he put it, “They might even give enough to 
build a new hospital. But if that same audience were asked to give a fraction of that amount 
to prevent children from ever contracting tuberculosis, the appeal would fall on deaf ears, 
because the appeal lacked the same emotional component.”36 
In 1919-1920, before talking of rehabilitation, the NER’s priority was to save orphans 
and to provide them with food. The NER had a similar approach to the ARC’s which 
consisted of the use of “modern” and scientific methods. In fact, the NER followed a strict 
caloric diet or daily menu of three full meals per day, which was prepared under the 
supervision of the director of the orphanage of the district, an American field worker (no 
further information on these people is available). This diet was balanced in accordance to the 
principles in Medical Bulletin no.2, dated November 30, 1919, and prepared by the Medical 
Relief, Third Section, of the NER.   
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The NER opened cocoa kitchens for children in the various districts. The ARA and 
Save the Children Fund adopted this method in many other European countries, including 
Russia during the 1920s famine. The NER also opened soup kitchens for children whose 
parents belonged to the native poor of various districts, or to the refugee class. As for the 
cocoa kitchens, the report does not indicate whether this solution was ad hoc, why it was 
adopted, and what plans had been discarded. On February 29, 1920, the NER was operating a 
total of forty-seven soup kitchens in which 46,707 children were being fed. In certain 
localities, such as Alexandropol or Erivan, where large numbers of refugees were 
concentrated in camps or barracks, tea or cocoa and bread were issued in the morning and 
evening in addition to the noon meal described. In this case, however, certain work, such as 
road repair, building construction, etc. was required of the refugees. This was not an 
exceptional requirement, and it was because the concept of self-help shared by all Western 
humanitarian organizations which believed that idle and apathetic refugees could become 
socially dangerous people.  
In connection with the NER public dispensary the NER opened milk stations for 
nursing mothers, newly born children and pregnant women. The applicant in each case was 
subjected to an examination by the dispensary doctor, who prescribed the formula for milk to 
be issued. Children up to the age of three years were received in these stations. The principal 
recipient of this relief was the mother, not the child. The NER principles were similar to 
those enforced by the ARC and the ARA in many European countries. Once again, the 
document does not indicate if these ideas had been previously enforced in a domestic context 
in America or if they had been previously enforced by missionary institutions in the Near 
East before the war. 
The NER hospitals were conducted for children, destitute inhabitants, and refugees. In 
the larger districts, such as Erivan, Kars, and Alexandropol, the children’s hospitals were 
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operated separately from those of adults. In other districts, certain wards were reserved in the 
children’s hospitals for adults. The document does not specify how local populations   
perceived this division. In all of the NER orphanages there were small infirmaries, which 
formed a part of the orphanage itself and received mild cases for a short period of time. 
Medical relief was extended to the child, as well as the adult population at large, through the 
NER free dispensaries or clinics where patients were fed and clothed. The daily average of 
these cases was over 5,000.  
 
Orphanages 
Soup Kitchens and Cocoa Kitchens 
Milk Stations 
Orphanage Hospitals 
Orphanage Infirmaries 
Public Dispensaries 
82 
47 
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46,707 
 
400 
4,000 
2,000 
1,000 
 
The second part of the report deals specifically with the distribution of the CF supplies and 
shows how important accountability was for the donor and the organization in charge of the 
operation. This donation ensured the expansion of the above-mentioned activities to the 
“maximum degree.” The distribution plan after the CF donation concerned over 70,000 
children, including those who were not in orphanages. It began when the ship Chincha 
arrived at Batoum at the end of February 1920. The unloading operations were secured by the 
NER and were completed on March 2, 1920. 
The third part of the report focused on the expansion of the child-feeding program. By 
the spring of 1920, the plotted curve of the orphanage curve showed that the peak had been 
reached. Many parents removed their children from the orphanages, and all destitute children 
had been received into them. In the district of Alexandropol, Kars, and Erivan, very few 
children, if any, were now seen on the streets. There was evidence in Tiflis that some parents 
used children to beg for money-making purposes. An effort to take these children into the 
orphanages was met with violent opposition on the part of the parents, but the general 
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condition of the child population throughout the districts was a satisfactory indication of the 
work the NER had carried out during the winter months. The report does not say how the 
NER relief workers attempted to persuade the parents not to send their children out to beg.  
The use of the term “violent opposition” signals that relief workers must have encountered 
various difficulties, which are not described in the report. Of course, the report which was 
intended for donors, emphasized success stories, such as a story in which local populations, 
or the parents of the children lack agency. No mention is made about the visits of parents to 
orphanages, and it is not explained why children with living parents were sent to orphanages 
and how often parents could visit them. The report also had a rather unclear explanation of 
why Armenian children were prioritized.  
The work of child feeding has received considerable exploitation in the Republics of 
Georgia and Azerbaijan as a result of the Commonwealth supplies. It was impossible 
heretofore to feed even to a limited extent the children of nationalities other than 
Armenian in those countries, as the only stores at the disposal of the NER were those 
purchased and destined for Armenia or for the Armenians. The work is now being 
carried out on a comparatively large scale in those two countries.  
 
The author of the report implies that Armenian children were given priority over all other 
children. The report does not say how many non-Armenian children needed to be fed nor 
does it expand on the conditions of non-Armenian children. The term “exploitation” might 
refer to criticism by the Georgian and Azerbaijan authorities with respect to child-feeding 
programs, although this is mere speculation on our part.   
The final chapter of the report was devoted to the “full value” of the donation by the 
CF. The author claimed that by August 1, 1920 the physical development of the children was 
steadily ameliorating. According to the report, the important effect of the feeding from a 
medical standpoint was already evident. The number of children in the hospital had already 
declined and was expected to decrease further. The report ended by stressing: 
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The child feeding work has added immeasurably to the prestige of the United States 
of America with the people of the Caucasus. It is planting the seed of certain 
American ideals and standards in the Near East which may later germinate into 
healthy growth with general benefit to the country at large. The appreciation of these 
people is almost ostentatious, even at the present time, but the real gratitude for this 
donation can only become fully expressed at that later date when the present child 
generation will form the manhood and womanhood of these newly established 
republics.
37
 
 
The general report was followed by a medical report compiled by the NER’s Caucasus 
Branch. The report expands on sanitation and preventive measures. Once again, experience 
gained by the Caucasus branch would be relevant as far as the preventive health programs 
and health education programs of the NER and NEF were concerned.   
   In a report, McAfee also wrote about the possibility of exporting some of the practices 
and expertises that were being acquired.
38
 For instance, many doctors became specialists. 
McAfee wrote the following regarding a group of girls in the Caucasus:  
They had had four or five years of training. We graduated these girls into hospitals 
that were often military hospitals. One item was missing which was a great phase of 
American development. This field which we had neglected was the great field of the 
visiting nurse. How to get this idea over was a problem; this idea of preventing 
disease instead of curing it. We took two or three of our best girls into a clinic in one 
village. Doctors visited periodically. We put two or three other girls in another clinic. 
We told them they were serving the human race in one of its most noble capacities— 
that of preventing disease. We had these girls come into the hospitals and tell the 
others what was being done. The whole psychology of school changed because we 
had turned the spotlight on an even greater field of service.
39
  
  
 
Conclusion 
The position of the NER with respect to so many other organizations active in the 
aftermath of the First World War was that it purported Christian values through its 
humanitarian workers, the majority of whom were missionaries. These humanitarians shared 
an American version of the older European “mission civilisatric” with other American 
secular relief workers. As was the case with many other “modern” Western humanitarian 
organizations, the NER underpinned its professional management, its efficiency, and 
scientific methods in carrying out relief operations. Despite its faith-based origins, the NER 
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shared a sense of superiority to secular organizations, and at the same time bridged traditional 
Christian values and the tools of modern humanitarianism. The NER also sought to ensure 
self-reliance in the refugees and other individuals to whom its relief was granted. 
 
Editor's Note: This research report is presented here with the author’s permission but should not be 
cited or quoted without the author’s consent.  
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